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Abstract
We derive a formal, decision-based method for comparing the performance of coun-
terfactual treatment regime predictions using the results of experiments that give rel-
evant information on the distribution of treated outcomes. Our approach allows us to
quantify and assess the statistical significance of differential performance for optimal
treatment regimes estimated from structural models, extrapolated treatment effects,
expert opinion, and other methods. We apply our method to evaluate optimal treat-
ment regimes for conditional cash transfer programs across countries where predictions
are generated using data from experimental evaluations in other countries and pre-
program data in the country of interest.
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1 Introduction
Social scientists often provide recommendations about the implementation of policies, which
determine whether and in what manner a given treatment should be applied in some tar-
get context. Crucial to this task is generating counterfactual predictions that to informs
such recommendations. The methods to which social scientists turn to for this purpose are
varied. They include quantitative extrapolations from existing randomized evaluations or
observational studies, predictions based on structural models that interpret behavioral pat-
terns in the target context, and more subjective expert opinions, among others. Our goal
in this paper is to offer a formal framework for evaluating the relative success of methods
for generating policy recommendations. We evaluate the success of ex ante policy recom-
mendations that can draw on pre-existing experiments and descriptive data to recommend
a treatment assignment in a target context. Then, we conduct an ex post evaluation of the
recommendation, based on information from experiments in the target context. We are thus
able to quantify and assess the statistical significance, ex post, of the differential performance
of various methods for generating ex ante recommendations. These ex post assessments can
inform choices over methods to produce ex ante recommendations for new contexts where
experimental data are not yet available.
Our framework is decision-based, considering optimal choices for a social planner seeking
to maximize a welfare objective under constraints. In the full development of our framework,
we consider a linear social welfare function, although the framework could take into consid-
eration preferences over inequality, uncertainty, status quo bias, or other modifications. The
planner is thought to face constraints that limit the set of policy options. For example,
the planner may face a budget constraint that limits the number and scale of treatments
that can be administered. Multiple methods may yield identical results for basic types of
recommendations — e.g., they may agree on whether the treatment is harmful or helpful on
average, in which case they would make the same recommendation regarding the alternatives
of “treat everyone” versus “treat no one.” But when it comes to estimating optimal policies,
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methods may differ in their recommendations. Such differences in recommendations would
be due to different methods’ predictions about how different types of people respond to
treatment (Manski, 2004; Dehejia, 2005; Hirano and Porter, 2009; Imai and Strauss, 2011;
Kitagawa and Tetenov, 2017; Athey and Wager, 2017) . The wider the range of admissible
policy options, the wider is the scope for methods to differ in their recommendations and
thus in their relative performance. Another way to put this is that the more refined the
policy decision at stake, the more we need to ask of the methods, and thus the more refined
will be our judgment about the performance of different methods.
What we refer to as a “method” is an approach for determining which of these pol-
icy options should be implemented. These include reduced form methods that rely on
conditional unconfoundedness to extrapolate conditional treatment effects using existing
experimental or observational evaluations from other contexts, as in Hotz et al. (2005) and
Dehejia et al. (2017). Another class of methods includes meta-analytical methods that model
heterogeneity across contexts, as in Dehejia (2003), Meager (2016), and Vivalt (2016). A
third class of methods includes structural models. These include models that interpret be-
havioral patterns among untreated observations within the target context so as to generate
counterfactual predictions about outcomes under treatment, as in Todd and Wolpin (2006)
and Todd and Wolpin (2008). They also include approaches that estimate of some structural
model parameters using untreated units in the target context and others from available ex-
perimental evidence, as in Attanasio et al. (2012). Hybrids of reduced form and structural
methods are also available, as in Gechter (2016). Finally, a fifth class of methods includes
the solicitation of subjective opinions of experts, as discussed in Banerjee et al. (2016) and
applied in DellaVigna and Pope (2017). Counterfactual prediction methods may need to
address biases that arise from non-random selection of contexts for producing evidence
(Allcott, 2015). In our application, we allow methods to draw on existing experimental
data from other contexts as well as data on covariates and untreated outcomes in the target
context. The resulting recommendations are thus “ex ante” insofar as they are made under
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uncertainty about the distribution of potential outcomes under treatment. An assessment
is then done ex post, using data from experiments that reveal the distribution of potential
outcomes under treatment. Our analysis allows us to determine, ex post, whether the pol-
icy recommendation from one or another method performed significantly better in terms of
promoting welfare.
We use our framework to evaluate conditional cash transfer policies for increasing chil-
dren’s school enrollment, a policy subject to widespread consideration around the world
(Parker and Vogl, 2018). We begin with an illustrative example of making a policy recom-
mendation for a conditional cash transfer program in Morocco. Ex ante, the methods can
draw upon data from a conditional cash transfer experiment in Mexico—specifically, the
PROGRESA randomized evaluation—as well as covariates and untreated outcome data in
Morocco. We consider two types of methods: (1) reduced form extrapolation of conditional
treatment effects from Mexico to Morocco and (2) a non-parametric structural model that
uses data from untreated households within Morocco. We then assess, ex post, the per-
formance of the two methods using the results of the randomized evaluation conducted by
Benhassine et al. (2015). The results show that the reduced form extrapolation outperforms
the non-parametric structural approach in this particular case. Our findings speak to the
question of whether policy recommendations should rely on internally valid evidence gen-
erated outside the target context, or whether one should rely on potentially confounded
evidence from within the target context, as in Pritchett and Sandefur (2013).
Our methodological contribution is a formal framework for evaluating policy recommen-
dations based on counterfactual predictions from competing methods. Our aim is to provide
tools that are more general in speaking to policy recommendations than the relatively infor-
mal and case-specific model validation exercises that regularly appear in the applied microe-
conomics literature; see, for example, Todd and Wolpin (2006), Keane and Wolpin (2007),
Duflo et al. (2012), and Wolpin (2013), who each use predictions into holdout samples to
evaluate the fit of structural models. Our framework for evaluating policy recommendation
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methods builds on Pesaran and Skouras (2002) and Granger and Machina (2006)’s notion of
using information on the intended use of predictions as a basis for judging methods, founda-
tional work on forecast evaluation theory by Diebold and Mariano (1995), White (2000),
and Hansen et al. (2011), as well as work on prediction-based model comparisons by
Keane and Wolpin (2007), Wolpin (2007), Wolpin (2013), Schorfheide and Wolpin (2012),
and Schorfheide and Wolpin (2016). We see our work as complementary to research by
DellaVigna and Pope (2017) on evaluating the quality of experts’ ex ante forecasts by using
experimental data ex post. Manski (1996, 2004), Dehejia (2005), Hirano and Porter (2009),
Tetenov (2012), Kitagawa and Tetenov (2017), and Athey and Wager (2017) address the
issue of deriving optimal treatment regimes in decision-theoretic terms in sample; we
extend these ideas to the evaluation of methods out of sample as well. Finally, our
application to the conditional cash transfer programs draws on the synthesis discus-
sions in Banerjee et al. (2017) and Garcia and Saavedra (2017) as well as the specific data
and analyses conducted by De Janvry and Sadoulet (2006), Todd and Wolpin (2006), and
Attanasio et al. (2012) for Mexico and Benhassine et al. (2015) for Morocco.
2 Setting
LetM define a set of methods under consideration. A method m ∈M produces predictions
for a set of real-valued treatment conditions, T , finite. Suppose that the status quo treatment
condition is given by t = 0 ∈ T for all m ∈ M. Considering our application below, we can
imagine that m could be a reduced form extrapolation method for predicting responses
to different subsidy schedules, which are elements in the set T , including the no subsidy
condition, t = 0.
Suppose we have C contexts, indexed by c ∈ {1, ..., C}. We consider a social planner
interested in using data from the C contexts to devise welfare-maximizing policies in a
set of target contexts. Let Dc be an indicator variable dividing the contexts into target
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and reference contexts, such that Dc = 1 when c is a target context and Dc = 0 when
c is a reference context. The planner wants to assess the methods in M according to
their ability to assign individuals to treatments from within T in a way that maximizes
the planner’s social welfare function in the target contexts, subject to potential constraints
on feasible treatments. A set of treatment conditions, Tc ⊆ T , is active in each context
c, although methods may be able to use data from a set Tc to generate counterfactual
predictions for treatments that are outside this set. For example, structural methods can
generate counterfactual predictions for treatment effects with treatments that have never
been implemented. For the target contexts, we suppose that ex ante, Tc = {0}, meaning
only data on the status quo conditions are available. In the reference contexts, ex ante, Tc
may contain treatments other than just the status quo. Thus, in the target contexts, only
the t = 0 treatment is active prior to the implementation of policy, and the social planner
is seeking a recommendation on how to introduce treatments from a feasible set of options
in T so as to maximize welfare, given the constraints. The recommendations are based on
methods that make counterfactual predictions for the target contexts. We observe an J-
vector of context level characteristics, Vc, which contains the indicator, Dc, as well as J − 1
other attributes, such that Supp (Vc) = V ⊆ RJ .
Within a given context c, let i index individuals. Each context is governed by a prob-
ability distribution, Pc, on the following: an individual-level treatment variable, Tic, where
Supp (Tic) = Tc; a K-vector of individual-level covariates, Wic, with Supp (Wic) =Wc ⊆ RK ;
and an individual-level potential outcome function, Y Pic : Tc → R, that maps treatments to
outcomes. These outcomes measure individual wellbeing from the planner’s perspective. We
suppose the following conditions on the outcome data:
C0. |E c[Y Pic (t)]| <∞ and 0 < V c[Y Pic (t)] <∞ for all t ∈ Tc and c ∈ {1, ..., C}.
Let Yit = Y
P
ic (Tic) be the observed outcome for unit i in context c. The observed data
consist of the context level characteristics and individual-level data, Oic = (Vc,Wic, Tic, Yic),
for random samples of individuals i ∈ {1, ..., nc} across contexts c = {1, ..., C}.
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For simplicity, we focus on the case where we can take individual-level treatments to
be binary, in which case T = {0, 1}, where t = 0 is a status quo control condition and
t = 1 a treated condition. In reality, treatments are never implemented identically, and so
t = 1 may represent different treatments in each context. The point is that methods will
use treated conditions from reference contexts to generate a counterfactual prediction for
the target context. Then, individuals’ potential outcomes are
(
Y Pic (1), Y
P
ic (0)
)
and observed
outcomes are given by Yic = TicY
P
ic (1),+(1−Tic)Y Pic (0). For a context c ∈ {1, .., C}, consider
the following conditions on the data generating process defining Pc:
C1. conditional random assignment,
(
Y Pic (1), Y
P
ic (0)
) ⊥ Tic|Wic = w for all w ∈ Wc;
C2. overlap, where probabilities of assignment, pc(w) := Pr[Tic = 1|Wic = w], are interior
such that 0 < b0 < pc(w) < b1 < 1 for all w ∈ Wc, and
C3. stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA; Rubin, 1980), such that for Tic = t,
Yic = Y
P
ic (t) with probability 1.
When conditions C1-C3 hold, the conditional (on covariates) potential outcome distribu-
tions for both the treatment and control groups in the reference contexts are identified.
In our setting, we suppose that, ex ante, we are working with a random sample for which
conditions C1-C3 hold in the reference contexts (for which Dic = 0). However, in the the
target contexts (for which Dc = 1), we suppose that, ex ante, we have a random sam-
ple only for units with Tic = 0, while the covariate distributions are also identified. As
such, ex ante, the distributions Pc[(Y
P
ic (0),Wic)|Vc, Dc = 0], Pc[(Y Pic (1),Wic)|Vc, Dc = 0],
and Pc[(Y
P
ic (0),Wic)|Vc, Dc = 1] are identified. The methods make use of these distribu-
tions to derive policy recommendations. Once the recommendations are submitted, we
then suppose that the conditions C1-C3 obtain in the target contexts, in which case the
Pc[(Y
P
ic (1),Wic)|Vc, Dc = 1] distributions are revealed. This allows the planner to judge, ex
post, the quality of the methods in terms of how their recommendations fair with respect
to welfare. Note that our specification of the potential outcomes, combined with assump-
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tion C3, rules out “interference,” including general equilibrium effects (Cox, 1958, p. 19;
Aronow and Samii, 2017).
3 Planner’s Objective and Ex Ante Recommendations
We can define the planner’s objective in context c in general terms as
max
pic∈Πc
U(Pc(πc))
where πc : V ×W → {0, 1} is a treatment assignment policy function that takes in covariate
values, conditional on contextual attributes Vc, and maps them to either treatment or control.
Then, Pc(πc) is the joint potential outcome-covariate distribution induced by πc. The set Πc
represents admissible treatment assignment rules determined by the planner, perhaps based
on budgetary or feasibility constraints. The restriction to the range {0, 1} follows from our
focus on binary treatments. If a richer set of treatment values T were under consideration,
the range of πc(·) could be defined as a distribution function over this T . Sometimes the set
of conditional treatment assignments that maximizes this objective ex ante is non-unique—
i.e., there are ties. For example, multiple units may share the same covariate value. The
treatment assignment that maximizes the objective, given the constraint, may assign some
fraction of such units to treatment. Then, all permutations of assignments would yield the
same ex ante value for the objective. We assume that πc encodes a tie-breaker rule that
is unconditionally statistically independent and equalizes probability of treatment for such
tied units.
In this general specification of the objective function, U(·) is an arbitrary functional on
the distribution induced by πc. This allows the planner to take into consideration arbi-
trary features of the potential outcome distributions and, possibly, distributions of potential
outcomes conditional on covariates. This admits possibilities such as inequality aversion or
preferences with respect to uncertainty (Dehejia, 2008), as well as asymmetry in preferences
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toward different treatments, such as status quo bias (Tetenov, 2012). One could also differen-
tially handle outcomes for different groups in society (e.g., households depending on whether
they have children). See also Manski (2004) and Hirano and Porter (2009) for specifications
that encode different social welfare objectives.
Current approaches to this problem (as in Manski, 2004, Tetenov, 2012) consider social
welfare that is linear in expected treatment and control outcomes. We begin with such
an approach. We suppose that we are operating in context c, and therefore suppress the
associated indexing except when necessary for clarification. Thus, we can define
U (P(π)) = E [π(Wi)Y Pi (1) + (1− π(Wi))Y Pi (0)]
= µ0 +
∫
W
π(w)E [Y Pi (1)− Y Pi (0)|Wi = w]dP(w)
= µ0 + E [π(W )τ(W )]
where µ0 = E [Y Pi (0)] and τ(W ) = E [Y
P
i (1)−Y Pi (0)|W ]. The policy function, π : V ×W →
[0, 1], maps individuals’ covariates, conditional on context level attributes, to a treatment
assignment probability. As such, the objective becomes,
max
pi∈Π
µ0 + E [π(W )τ(W )] . (1)
In our setting, we have data to estimate the status quo control mean µ0 directly. Then,
a method m generates a point estimate τˆm to use in recommending an assignment function
πm that solves the planner’s problem. Under linear social welfare, this implies
πm = arg max
pi∈Π
E [π(W )τˆm(W )] . (2)
Then, ex post welfare associated with m’s recommendation is
U(πm) = µ
0 + E [πm(W )τ(W )] . (3)
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A method could make a recommendation to account for risk aversion on the part of the
planner due to uncertainty about conditional treatment effects. A method m may thus yield
not only point predictions but also distribution predictions for conditional treatment effects,
Fˆm(·|W ). Suppose a continuous function, u(·), that capture the planner’s risk preferences.
Let µt(W ) = E [Y Pi (t)|W ]. Then, a method m could account for risk aversion ex ante by
making a recommendation as
πum = arg max
pi∈Π
E
[∫
u
(
µ0(W ) + π(W )τ
)
dFˆm(τ |W )
]
.
Ex post welfare would be given by
Uu(πum) = E
{
u
(
πum(Wi)Y
P
i (1)− [1− πum(Wi)]Y Pi (0)
)}
= E
{
πum(Wi)u(Y
P
i (1))− [1− πum(Wi)]u(Y Pi (0))
}
,
where the second equality is due to πum(·) ∈ {0, 1} and the statistically independent tie-
breaker rule.
4 Ex Post Inference
Ex post, we obtain a random sample of experimental units in the target context for which
conditions C1-C3 hold. We assume that in this ex post experiment, treatment assignment
probabilities are given by p(Wi), and that these probabilities are known. We use this sample
to check the welfare implications of the recommendations from different methods. A linear
welfare contrast for two models, l and m, is given by
∆lm = U(πm)− U(πl) = E [(πm(Wi)− πl(Wi)) (Y Pi (1)− Y Pi (0))]
= E [(πm(Wi)− πl(Wi)) Y Pi (1)]− E [(πm(Wi)− πl(Wi))Y Pi (0)].
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The value of ∆lm is driven by covariate values for which methods disagree, that is, W such
that πm(W ) 6= πl(W ), along with the weight put on such covariate values when forming the
target population expectation E [·].
The experimental data in our target context allow us to estimate this welfare contrast.
Given a random sample of size N in the target context, we consider an estimator for the
linear welfare contrast based on inverse-probability of treatment weighting with normalized
weights. This estimator is efficient among consistent estimators that avoid modeling of either
the potential outcome surfaces or conditional treatment probabilities (Hirano et al., 2003;
Lunceford and Davidian, 2004; Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009, 35). We define the estimator
as
∆ˆlm =
∑N
i=1
Ti
p(Wi)
(πm(Wi)− πl(Wi))Yi∑N
i=1
Ti
p(Wi)
−
∑N
i=1
(1−Ti)
1−p(Wi)
(πm(Wi)− πl(Wi)) Yi∑N
i=1
(1−Ti)
1−p(Wi)
.
Inference for this estimator is based on the random sampling of (Yi, Ti,Wi) values from P
under conditions C0-C3.
With risk aversion, the welfare contrast is
∆ulm = U
u(πum)− Uu(πul )
= E [(πm(Wi)− πl(Wi)) u(Y Pi (1))]− E [(πm(Wi)− πl(Wi)) u(Y Pi (0))].
Analogous to the estimator for the linear welfare contrast, an efficient estimator for the
welfare contrast under risk aversion is
∆ˆulm =
∑N
i=1
Ti
p(Wi)
(πm(Wi)− πl(Wi)) u(Yi)∑N
i=1
Ti
p(Wi)
−
∑N
i=1
(1−Ti)
1−p(Wi)
(πm(Wi)− πl(Wi)) u(Yi)∑N
i=1
(1−Ti)
1−p(Wi)
.
Then, inference for ∆ˆulm is also analogous, simply substituting in the outcomes transformed
by u(·).
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We can consider a family of functionals,
∆glm = E [(πm(Wi)− πl(Wi)) g(Y Pi (1))]− E [(πm(Wi)− πl(Wi)) g(Y Pi (0))],
for g : R → R continuous, where ∆lm is given by defining g(·) as the identity function and
∆ulm is given by defining g(y) = u(y) for all y ∈ R. Define
∆ˆglm =
∑N
i=1
Ti
p(Wi)
(πm(Wi)− πl(Wi)) g(Yi)∑N
i=1
Ti
p(Wi)
−
∑N
i=1
1−Ti
1−p(Wi)
(πm(Wi)− πl(Wi)) g(Yi)∑N
i=1
1−Ti
1−p(Wi)
.
Then we have the following:
Proposition 1. Under conditions C1-C3 and supposing |E [g(Y Pi (t))]| < ∞ and 0 <
|V [g(Y Pi (t))]| <∞ for t ∈ {0, 1}, as N →∞
√
N
(
∆ˆglm −∆glm
)
√
Vˆ∆g
lm
d→ N(0, 1),
where
Vˆ∆g
lm
=
∑N
i=1
Ti
p(Wi)2
[
(πm(Wi)− πl(Wi))g(Yi)− δˆ1
]2
∑N
i=1
Ti
p(Wi)
+
∑N
i=1
1−Ti
[1−p(Wi)]2
[
(πm(Wi)− πl(Wi))g(Yi)− δˆ1
]2
∑N
i=1
1−Ti
1−p(Wi)
,
and
δˆ1 =
∑N
i=1
Ti
p(Wi)
(πm(Wi)− πl(Wi)) g(Yi)∑N
i=1
Ti
p(Wi)
, and δˆ0 =
∑N
i=1
1−Ti
1−p(Wi)
(πm(Wi)− πl(Wi)) g(Yi)∑N
i=1
1−Ti
1−p(Wi)
.
All proofs are contained in the appendix. Conditional on Wi = w, the recommendations,
πm(w) and πl(w), are fixed. Our uncertainty about the welfare contrast is due to sampling
and treatment assignment variation in the data gathered in the target context that we use
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for the ex post assessment.1
Proposition 1 is sufficient to perform inference for any pair of methods.
Hansen et al. (2011) provide a sequential multiple testing algorithm for establishing a “model
confidence set” (MCS) of level 1−α, which allows one to distinguish a set of best performing
algorithms with an asymptotic error rate of α.
MCS implementation is relatively straightforward. The iterative procedure is as follows.
1. For all l, m ∈M form the pairwise t-statistics
tlm =
∆ˆglm√
Vˆ
g
∆lm
2. Test the null hypothesis of equal welfare for all methods in M using the test statistic
TR,M = max
l,m∈M
|tlm|.
Note that the distribution of TR,M under the null hypothesis (∆
g
lm = 0 ∀ l, m ∈ M) is
difficult to characterize analytically with many models. We use the bootstrap procedure
proposed in Hansen et al. (2011). If we fail to reject the null hypothesis at level 1−α,
our MCS is M and we stop.
3. Otherwise we form a new set of methods, M1, which omits the method with the worst
studentized welfare contrast. I.e., l satisfying
arg min
l∈M
inf
m∈M
tlm.
We then repeat steps 1 and 2 with M1 in place of M.
1Treating the treatment assignment rules as fixed is necessary to allow expert predictions to be elements
ofM. Diebold (2015) makes this point in reviewing Diebold and Mariano (1995) and the literature following
it, drawing a distinction between Diebold and Mariano (1995) and West (1996), which additionally considers
uncertainty arising from the samples on which models are fitted to generate predictions.
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4. Steps 1, 2, and 3 are repeated until arriving at anMs at which the null of equal welfare
cannot be rejected at level 1− α at which point Ms is our MCS.
5 Empirical Illustration
For an empirical illustration, we use data from Mexico and Morocco on the effects of con-
ditional cash transfers (CCTs) on primary school enrollment. We consider a policy scenario
where a planner in Morocco is seeking recommendations under linear social welfare for im-
plementing a conditional cash transfer (CCT) program. We use data from randomized
evaluations of the PROGRESA program in Mexico (Schultz, 2004; Behrman et al., 2005;
De Janvry and Sadoulet, 2006; Todd and Wolpin, 2006; Attanasio et al., 2012) and the
TAYSSIR program in Morocco (Benhassine et al., 2015). To construct the ex ante evalu-
ations, we are limited to using the full data from Mexico and then only the control group
data from Morocco. The ex post assessment is done using the full experimental data from
Morocco.
Our assessment compares the performance of two different methods. The first is re-
duced form extrapolation of conditional treatment effects, as per, e.g., Hotz et al. (2005)
and Dehejia et al. (2016). We use the Mexico data to estimate treatment effects conditional
on gender and age, and then extrapolate those estimates to Morocco to determine how
treatment should be allocated optimally by gender and age in Mexico. The second is a non-
parametric structural approach due to Todd and Wolpin (2008). This structural approach
uses only the control group data within Morocco, modeling responsiveness to cash transfers
to predict treatment effects by age and gender. This comparison allows us to assess whether
theoretically-informed, local observational analysis might be preferable to more agnostic ex-
trapolation of well-identified experimental effects from out of context. This particular issue
is one that Pritchett and Sandefur (2013) raise in a discussion about potential trade-offs
between internal and external validity.
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To relate this application to our general analysis above, i indexes children, c country
(Mexico or Morocco), and then the outcome Yic refers to school enrollment for child i in
context c. The covariate set W includes the set of gender-by-age strata for boys and girls
between 10 to 16 years old. The policy space Π is restricted to allow for transfers that
amount to 50 Moroccan dirhams (MAD) per child per month on average, averaging over
both attendees and non-attendees, with transfers going to attendees being 100 MAD per
month. This restriction on the policy space is arbitrary, but it forces the methods to make
recommendations about who to include and who to exclude from treatment.
Our covariates are discretely distributed over 14 age-by-gender strata, and the restrictions
on the policy space can be expressed as a budget constraint. Thus, we can express the
solution to the linear welfare problem (2) as
πm = arg max
pi∈Π
∑
w∈W
ρˆw[π(w)τˆm(w)] (4)
subject to∑
w∈W
100ρˆwπ(w)[µˆ
0
m(w) + τˆm(w)] ≤ 50,
where ρˆw is the estimated share of children in the age-by-gender stratum w, τˆm(w) is the
estimated conditional treatment effect in stratum w from method m, and µˆ0m(w) is the
estimated enrollment rate in stratum w in Morocco. We estimate the ρˆw values from the
Morocco control group data. Panel I of Table 1 displays the estimated shares for the age-
by-gender strata. Given (ρˆw, τˆm(w)), we solve for πm through linear programming.
The τˆm(w) values are estimated using our two methods. The first method is the reduced
form approach that takes stratum-specific treatment effect estimates from the Mexico exper-
iment. We estimate these stratum-specific treatment effects using Attanasio et al. (2012)’s
difference-in-difference approach on the PROGRESA evaluation dataset. Specifically,
Behrman and Todd (1999) and Attanasio et al. (2012) document differences in school en-
rollment rates among non-eligible households in treatment vs. control communities in the
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PROGRESA dataset. These differences make it appear as if the PROGRESA CCT had a
significant impact on enrollment rates among households who could not receive payments for
having their children go to school. Attanasio et al. (2012) therefore investigate pre-to-post
program implementation changes in enrollment rates in treatment vs. control communities
for eligible and ineligible households through a difference-in-differences specification and find
no effect for ineligible households. We therefore follow their approach and report and use,
for each stratum, the difference in the change in enrollment rates for eligible households in
treated communities compared to control.
These conditional treatment effect estimates are given in Panel II of Table 1.
The treatment effects show an inverted-U shape in age for both males and females.
As documented elsewhere in the literature on PROGRESA (see e.g. Figure 1 in
De Janvry and Sadoulet (2006)), the larger effects for children in their early teen years ap-
pear to be a function of the age at which the transition to secondary school occurs. Encourag-
ing children to continue to secondary school is a primary driver of the effect of PROGRESA
on school enrollment. To the extent that the structure of the Moroccan education system
differs from the Mexican, we may not expect these exact patterns to generalize to Morocco
which would hurt the performance of an eligibility scheme based on PROGRESA but imple-
mented in Morocco.
The second method uses a non-parametric structural model of school attendance proposed
in Todd and Wolpin (2008). We can use the one-child case to illustrate how the estimation
works. Suppose that a household’s utility maximization problem when choosing school
enrollment y is given by
max
y
U(c, y;w, ǫ)
subject to c = n+ e(1− y),
where c is consumption, n is household income excluding child earnings, e is the child’s
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wage offer. w and ǫ are measured and unmeasured household characteristics which shift
preferences for schooling, respectively. An optimal school attendance decision is given by,
y∗ = φ(n, e;w, ǫ) = 1{U(n, 1;w, ǫ) > U(n + e, 0;w, ǫ)}.
Now, introducing a conditional subsidy s affects the budget constraint as,
c = n+ e(1− y) + sy = (n+ s) + (e− s)(1− y),
and so
y∗∗ = φ(n+ s, e− s;w, ǫ).
Define n˜ = n+ s and e˜ = e− s, and let the distribution of ǫ be such that
f(ǫ|n, e, w) = f(ǫ|n˜, e˜, w) = f(ǫ|w),
which means that n and e are exogenous. Under this model, we can predict the effect of the
subsidy for any child in our Moroccan control group by plugging her (n˜, e˜) into the fit of a
non-parametric regression of enrollment, y, on n, e, and w.
We follow Todd and Wolpin (2008) in using regional wages in industries employing most
children to infer wage offers. Specifically, we measure a child’s wage offer using the average
wage of a worker in agriculture or ranching among households having at least one member
in the child’s school. Since the Moroccan control group consists of only 1193 children, in
practice we do not include stratum dummies in the non-parametric regression. Different
age-by-gender statrum-specific treatment effects, reported in Panel III of Table 1, arise from
differences in the average treated outcomes the procedure predicts for each subgroup. These
results display roughly an order of magnitude more variability than those in Panel II. This
may be an issue of selection, or of thin support for some common values of (n˜, e˜).
We use each method’s conditional treatment effect estimates to solve (4), yielding distinct
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πm recommendation vectors for m being either the Reduced Form Extrapolation or Non-
parametric Structural method. These recommendations are displayed in Panels V and VI of
Table 1. Given the linear welfare objective, the recommendations amount to taking strata
for which treatment effects are positive, then rank-ordering them in their magnitude, and
then going down the ranks and setting πm(w) = 1 until one hits the budget constraint. We
see that for the reduced form extrapolation, the budget is exhausted before all units in the
female 10-year old cell can be treated, in which case the recommendation is to assign 37.2%
to treatment. For the non-parametric structural approach, only the strata for females 12
years of age or older have positive treatment effects. The budget allows for treatment of all
children in these strata. In fact, the main difference between the two assignment schemes is
that the non-parametric structural approach does not advocate hitting the budget constraint
preferring, instead, to avoid the negative treatment effects it believes would result from
treating younger children.
The ex post analysis takes in these recommendations and then uses estimated conditional
average treatment effects for Morocco to estimate the welfare contrast for the two methods.
The estimates are given in panel IV of Table 1. As in PROGRESA, treatment effects are
small for younger children due to near-universality of enrollment at these ages. There are
also spikes in the age-specific treatment effects, although they do not occur at exactly the
same ages as in PROGRESA.
Estimating the welfare contrast yields an estimate suggesting that the PROGRESA-based
extrapolation outperforms the non-parametric structural model by 0.029 percentage points
of enrollment. The estimated standard error on the difference is 0.006 so the difference
is highly statistically significant. We can compare this difference to the overall average
treatment effect from the Morocco study, which is 0.085 (standard error = 0.011).
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6 Conclusion
We develop a decision-based approach to comparing the relative performance of methods
for generating counterfactual predictions that are then used to make policy recommenda-
tions. We consider a social planner who is operating in a target context and is seeking
recommendations on what policy to choose from a set of feasible options. The richness of
the space of policy options determines the nature of the recommendations being sought —
e.g., whether a simple up-or-down recommendation to treat everyone or no one, or a more
refined recommendation about who should be treated and who not. Recommendations could
be based on econometric estimates, whether reduced form or structural, or expert opinions.
Our leading application is one where the planner maximizes a linear welfare objective in
assigning treatments on the basis of available covariate information. In this case, the suc-
cess of a method for generating recommendations depends on how accurately it can predict
conditional treatment effects in the target context. We also demonstrate how one can take
into account considerations such as risk aversion by using estimated of conditional treatment
effect distributions.
We define a welfare contrast to use for conducting an ex post analysis of how well different
methods performed with respect to the planner’s goals. We estimate this welfare contrast by
using experimental data that reveals how a treatment affects the outcome distribution in the
target population. The welfare contrast is straightforward to compute, and it allows us to
judge whether one method outperforms another in a manner that is statistically significant.
We provide an empirical illustration that considers a planner seeking a recommendation
on how to implement program using conditional cash transfers (CCTs) to boost school enroll-
ment in Morocco. The data available for generating recommendations include a randomized
evaluation of CCTs in Mexico as well as data from Moroccan households under the status
quo ex ante, in which no CCTs have been applied. We generate recommendations from two
methods. The first method is reduced form extrapolation of conditional treatment effects
estimates from Mexico to Morocco. The second uses a non-parametric structural model of
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school enrollment fit to the Moroccan survey data to predict conditional treatment effects.
We then perform an ex post evaluation of these two methods using data from a randomized
evaluation of CCTs in Morocco. In our application, reduced form extrapolation significantly
outperforms the non-parametric structural approach primarily because the structural ap-
proach predicts negative treatment effects for several subgroups. We view this toy example
as helping build intuition for which kinds of methods to evaluate in a full-featured empir-
ical portion of the paper including the contexts from Banerjee et al. (2017) which we will
pre-specify.
We see this exercise as making three contributions. First, as our application attempts
to show, it provides a clear framework to assess internal validity versus external validity
trade-offs. In particular, our application allows us to assess how robust and internally valid
estimates from external contexts fare relative to within-context estimates that may be bi-
ased due to model misspecification (Pritchett and Sandefur, 2013). Second, it provides a
principled basis for assessing the performance of different methods by tying the assessment
to welfare considerations. This is important, because different objective functions can im-
ply different rank orderings of methods. Our approach thus forces one to first consider the
welfare objective so as to be clear about the relevant objective. Third, we show that each ex-
periment or observational study may contain much more decision-relevant information than
would be contained in a single treatment effect estimate.
We are undertaking a number of extensions to what we have done here. The first is
to consider a wider range of methods for generating conditional treatment effect estimates.
Regularized or machine learning tools may improve upon the non- and semi-parametric ap-
proaches used in the example above. Structural approaches that do more to combine external
and internal data may also yield better predictions. Moreover, model selection or model av-
eraging approaches based on our welfare criteria may lead to better predictions. We also
plan to work with evidence bases that include more external contexts. In doing so, we would
want to account for site selection, as per Allcott (2015) and Gechter and Meager (2018).
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A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. By the weak law of large numbers, Slutsky’s theorem, and conditions
C2 and C3, ∆ˆglm has the same limit as
∆˜glm =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Ti
p(Wi)
(πm(Wi)− πl(Wi)) g(Y Pi (1))
− 1
N
N∑
i=1
1− Ti
1− p(Wi) (πm(Wi)− πl(Wi)) g(Y
P
i (0)).
Take the first term on the right-hand side. By the weak law of large numbers, iterated
expectations, and condition C1,
1
N
N∑
i=1
Ti
p(Wi)
(πm(Wi)− πl(Wi)) g(Y Pi (1))
p→ E
[
E [Ti|W ] 1
p(W )
E [(πm(Wi)− πl(Wi)) g(Y Pi (1))|W ]
]
= E
[
(πm(Wi)− πl(Wi)) g(Y Pi (1))
]
,
and similar for the second term. Thus as N → ∞, E [∆ˆglm −∆glm]
p→ 0. Having established
that ∆ˆglm is asymptotically unbiased for ∆
g
lm, inference follows from the usual generalized
method of moments results (Newey and McFadden, 1994; Lunceford and Davidian, 2004).
To see this, first note that ∆ˆglm = δˆ1 − δˆ0 for (δˆ1, δˆ0) that solve the score equations
N∑
i=1
ψ1(δˆ1) = 0 and
N∑
i=1
ψ0(δˆ0) = 0,
where ψ1(δˆ1) =
Ti
[
(πm(Wi)− πl(Wi))g(Yi)− δˆ1
]
p(Wi)
,
and ψ0(δˆ0) =
(1− Ti)
[
(πm(Wi)− πl(Wi))g(Yi)− δˆ0
]
1− p(Wi) .
21
Then, given random sampling, bounded first and second moments, and conditions C1-C2,
we have √
N
(
∆ˆglm −∆glm
)
√
V∆g
lm
d→ N(0, 1), (5)
where
V∆g
lm
= E [ψ1(δ1)
2 + ψ0(δ0)
2]
= E
{[
(πm(Wi)− πl(Wi))g(Y Pi (1))− δ1
]2
p(Wi)
+
[
(πm(Wi)− πl(Wi))g(Y Pi (0))− δ0
]2
1− p(Wi)
}
,
with δt = E [(πm(Wi) − πl(Wi))g(Y Pi (t))]. Then, by the same conditions for which ∆ˆglm is
consistent for ∆glm, Vˆ∆glm is consistent for V∆
g
lm
.
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Tables
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Table 1: Results for Morocco CCT Recommendations
I. Population Shares
age male female
10 0.069 0.066
11 0.079 0.082
12 0.089 0.082
13 0.085 0.080
14 0.068 0.066
15 0.061 0.060
16 0.054 0.057
Conditional Treatment Effects
II. Reduced Form Extrapolation III. Non-Parametric Structural IV. Morocco
age male female
10 0.023 0.046
11 0.031 0.003
12 0.050 0.095
13 0.041 0.063
14 0.126 0.086
15 0.085 0.157
16 0.059 0.013
age male female
10 -0.265 -0.243
11 -0.231 -0.227
12 -0.209 -0.052
13 -0.088 0.018
14 0.013 0.294
15 0.232 0.426
16 0.272 0.557
age male female
10 0.010 0.011
11 0.004 0.043
12 0.044 0.180
13 0.112 0.144
14 0.105 0.239
15 0.189 0.080
16 0.128 0.088
Treatment Assignment Recommendations
V. Reduced Form Extrapolation VI. Non-Parametric Structural VII. Weighted Difference
age male female
10 0.000 0.372
11 0.000 0.000
12 1.000 1.000
13 1.000 1.000
14 1.000 1.000
15 1.000 1.000
16 1.000 1.000
age male female
10 0.000 0.000
11 0.000 0.000
12 0.000 0.000
13 0.000 1.000
14 1.000 1.000
15 1.000 1.000
16 1.000 1.000
age male female
10 0.000 0.025
11 0.000 0.000
12 0.089 0.082
13 0.085 0.000
14 0.000 0.000
15 0.000 0.000
16 0.000 0.000
Notes: Panels I and II show the estimates of the conditional effect of the CCT on enrollment for the gender-
by-age strata based on the reduced form extrapolation and non-parametric structural methods, respectively.
Panel III shows the estimated share of the population of children in the gender-by-age strata from the
Morocco data. Panels IV and V show the resulting recommended treatment assignment recommendations
from the two methods. Panel VI shows the difference in recommendations, weighted by population shares.
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